## **FMECA** Plus

## **Rethinking the Boundaries of the Traditional FMECA**

The **FMECA Plus** capability in **eXpress** transcends customary disciplinary barriers, allowing engineers and analysts in different areas of design to integrate the results of their respective efforts. The flexibility of the **FMECA Plus** engine not only fosters non-traditional uses of FMECA-related data, but also adds some simple, yet powerful twists to standard FMECA-based activities.

Item Failure Root Failure Mode Causes Local   Fvalve:Valve Insufficcient Pressure Insufficcient Pressure (Prognostic Valve Prognostic Limit Fue Non-Constant Flow (Surging) Eratic operation (sticky) Valve Prognostic Limit Fue Stuck Closed (mechanical/electrical) Stuck Closed Valve Prognostic Limit Fue Solenoid Failure   Stuck open (mechanical/electrical) Solenoid Failure Compensating Provisions   Landing Gear Landing Gear_Failure Landing Gear_Failure Degree of Redundacy may provide sufficient paths to allow in Degree of Redundacy may provide sufficient paths to allow in VCU   PWR Relay PWR Relay_Failure PWR Relay Failure Degree of Redundacy may provide sufficient paths to allow in VCU DISCRETE OUTPUT   VCU ECU BIT Valid Indication failure VCU:PWR SUPPLY FAIL VCU:DISCRETE OUTPUT VCU:DISCRETE OUTPUT   ENG Controller_control Failure ENG Controller_control I ENG Controller_control I Degree of Redundacy may provide sufficient paths to allow in VCU:DISCRETE OUTPUT	- Failure	Deat Failure Mad		Failure Effects							
	Next Hig	Next Higher		End Item							
Fvalve:Valve	Insuffiecient Pressure	Insuffiecient Pressure (	(Prognostic	Valve Prognostic Limit	Fuel Assy:Fuel Cor	ntrol Failure	Unable to cor	ntrol fuel syster	m		
	Non-Constant Flow (Surging)	Eratic operation (sticky)	)	Valve Prognostic Limit	Fuel Assy:Fuel Cor	ntrol Failure	Unable to cor	ntrol fuel syster	m		
i i	Stuck Closed (mechanical/electrical)	Stuck Closed		Valve Failure	Valve Failure Fuel Assy:Fuel Con		trol Failure Unable to control fuel system		m		
i i		Solenoid Failure				9	everity		4	Diagnosti	c Coverage
	Stuck open (mechanical/electrical)	Solenoid Failure Stuck open	Compensating Provisions			č	lass	Failure Ratio	Failure Rate	Failure Detected	Fault Group Sizes
Landing Gear	Landing Gear_Failure	Landing Gear_Failure	Degree of Red	Degree of Redundacy may provide sufficient paths to allow return to base			/ III - Marginal	6.0000	0.045413	Yes	6
Pilot Control	Pilot Control_Failure	Pilot Control_Failure	Degree of Red	undacy may provide sufficient paths	to allow return to base	Category	III - Marginal	19.0000	0.143808	No	N/A
PWR Relay	PWR Relay_Failure	PWR Relay Failure	Degree of Red	lundacy may provide sufficient path	s to allow return to base	Category	/ III - Marginal	19.0000	0.143808	No	N/A
VCU	ECU BIT Valid Indication failure	VCU:PWR SUPPLY FAIL	4								-
4		VCU:DISCRETE OUTPU7	4			Categor	y II - Critical	100.0000	5.000000	Yes	2
4		VCU:DISCRETE OUTPU7	1			Categor	y II - Critical	100.0000	7.000000	Yes	2
4	ENG Controller_control Failure ENG Cor	ENG Controller_control	. <u>.</u>								
4						Category	/ III - Marginal	100.0000	7.300000	Yes	7
			1					12.1212	0.763636	Yes	2 1
			Degree of Red	Jundacy may provide sufficient path	s to allow return to base	Categor	y II - Critical	100.0000	6.300000	Yes	1

System can still maintain control but other inputs

Derived entirely from data in an **eXpress** Diagnostic Study, the **eXpress** Diagnostic FMEA Chart ties together details of the system from Design, Reliability, Test, Diagnostic and Systems Engineering efforts

			Diagnostic Coverage						
Failure Rate	Severity	Relative Criticality	Failure Detected	Fault Isolation					
T anare reate	Class			Uniquely Isolated	Number of Root FMs in Fault Groups	Fault Groups	Fault Group Sizes (Number of Items)		
31.250000	Category I - Catastrophic	31.2500	Yes	No	10	Fault Group # 84	2		
31.250000	Category I - Catastrophic	31.2500	Yes	No	10	Fault Group # 84	2		
57.300000	Category III - Marginal	28.6500	Yes	No	20	Fault Group # 4	7		
31.250000	Category II - Critical	23.4375	Yes	No	4	Fault Group # 89	2		
20.833333	Category I - Catastrophic	20.8333	Yes	No	10	Fault Group # 84	2		
10.416667	Category I - Catastrophic	10.4167	Yes	No	9	Fault Group # 91	1		
10.416667	Category I - Catastrophic	10.4167	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
10.416667	Category I - Catastrophic	10.4167	Yes	No	10	Fault Group # 84	2		
10.416667	Category I - Catastrophic	10.4167	Yes	No	10	Fault Group # 84	2		
10.416667	Category I - Catastrophic	10.4167	Yes	No	4	Fault Group # 89	2		
10.416667	Category I - Catastrophic	10.4167	Yes	No	10	Fault Group # 84	2		
10.416667	Category I - Catastrophic	10.4167	Yes	No	4	Fault Group # 89	2		
10.416667	Category II - Critical	7.8125	Yes	Yes	1	Fault Group # 60	1		
10.416667	Category II - Critical	7.8125	Yes	Yes	1	Fault Group # 73	1		
10.416667	Category II - Critical	7.8125	Yes	Yes	1	Fault Group # 64	1		
10.416667	Category II - Critical	7.8125	Yes	Yes	1	Fault Group # 69	1		
10.416667	Category II - Critical	7.8125	Yes	Yes	1	Fault Group # 65	1		
10.416667	Category II - Critical	7.8125	Yes	Yes	1	Fault Group # 68	1		
10.416667	Category II - Critical	7.8125	Yes	Yes	1	Fault Group # 61	1		
10.416667	Category II - Critical	7.8125	Yes	Yes	1	Fault Group # 71	1		
10.416667	Category II - Critical	7.8125	Yes	Yes	1	Fault Group # 62	1		

This excerpt from an **eXpress** Critical Failure Diagnosis Chart shows the columns that describe the fault detection and isolation that can be achieved for each critical failure.

**A Firmer Foundation** – Diagnostic data in each **FMECA Plus** chart is derived directly from diagnostic analysis in **eXpress**, so analysts can be sure that results are based on the actual system diagnostic design, rather than on speculative bestguesses by individuals not involved in the diagnostic engineering process.

		Seventy		Occurr	ence	Detectio	n	-
Failure	ltem	Severity	Severity Rating	Failure Rate	Occurrence Rating	Overall Pctg. of	Detection Rating	Risk Priority Number (RPN)
		Ciuso	S		0	Tallare Delected	D	
lypass_Failure	JET ENGINE	Category I - Catastrophic	10	104.072917	1	0.00	10	100
Stuck Closed (mechanical/electrical)	Fvalve:Valve	Category III - Marginal	4	0.143808	1	0.00	10	40
stuck open (mechanical/electrical)	Fvalve:Valve	Category III - Marginal	4	0.143808	1	0.00	10	40
Inable to monitor Engine parameters	JET ENGINE	Category II - Critical	7	1769.239583	4	100.00	1	28
oss of Avionic Processor	ECU	Category II - Critical	7	9.803865	1	71.40	4	28
AN_Failure	JET ENGINE	Category I - Catastrophic	10	312.218750	2	100.00	1	20
nner Turbine_Failure	JET ENGINE	Category I - Catastrophic	10	208.145833	2	100.00	1	20
Outer Turbine_Failure	JET ENGINE	Category I - Catastrophic	10	312.218750	2	100.00	1	20
pen monitor cable	Fuel Cable	Category III - Marginal	4	1.225000	1	85.71	3	12
shorted monitor cable	Fuel Cable	Category III - Marginal	4	0.525000	1	85.71	3	12
Iternator_Failure	JET ENGINE	Category I - Catastrophic	10	104.072917	1	100.00	1	10
combustion Chamber_Failure	JET ENGINE	Category I - Catastrophic	10	104.072917	1	100.00	1	10
compressor_Failure	JET ENGINE	Category I - Catastrophic	10	104.072917	1	100.00	1	10
an Drive_Failure	JET ENGINE	Category I - Catastrophic	10	104.072917	1	100.00	1	10
uel Control_Failure	JET ENGINE	Category I - Catastrophic	10	104.072917	1	100.00	1	10
starter_Failure	JET ENGINE	Category I - Catastrophic	10	104.072917	1	100.00	1	10
comm. Interface_Failure	Comm. Interface	Category II - Critical	7	4.000000	1	100.00	1	7

The **eXpress** Risk Priority Assessment Chart shows the Severity, Occurrence and Detection ratings for each failure. A detailed version of this chart lists the design details upon which these ratings are based.

**More Easily Updated** — With **FMECA Plus**, design updates are a breeze. Simply modify the applicable areas of your *eXpress* model (importing data, of course, when available), rerun your diagnostic analysis and then regenerate the desired FMECA chart(s). FMECA updates no longer require months-long manual efforts. Invest in your data, not in manpower!

**Better Leverage** — With **FMECA Plus**, the results of different analysis activities can be united in a single arena, allowing analysts from different disciplines to reap the benefits of each other's efforts.

The **eXpress** Critical Failure Diagnosis Chart, for instance, lists all failures in order of relative criticality, based on Reliability Analysis data. Details from the Test & Diagnostic Engineering efforts are then used to identify the extent to which each failure can be detected and isolated by actual system diagnostics.

## **FMECA PIUS** Rethinking the Boundaries of the Traditional FMECA

**Respecting Tradition** – FMEAs come in many varieties, with different formats championed by different industries, projects, companies and individuals. Nevertheless, all FMEAs remain variations on a common theme—tracing the effects of failure upon system behavior and identifying specific failure modes that require special attention. Often the best way of respecting tradition is to allow it to be fiddled with. That's why **FMECA Plus** doesn't just allow, but literally *expects* chart content and layout to be customized to satisfy industry, project, company or personal requirements.



The "traditional" worksheet configurations offered within FMECA Plus (such as these formats based on MIL-STD-1629A) can be easily customized both in terms of content and appearance to satisfy an endless variety of analysis needs.

**Personalizing with Attributes** – Because columns can be added in **FMECA Plus** for any attribute defined in *eXpress*, analysts can easily personalize their charts using industry, project or company-specific data (such as LCN numbers, SMR codes, ARINC labels, Manufacturer data, BIT messages, IETM references, or values from other user-defined *eXpress* attributes).

	Failura	Root Failure Mode	Fault Circulture	Diagnosti	Failure Data	
liem	railure	Causes	raul Signature	Fault Groups	Fault Group Items	Failure Rate
Landing Gear	Landing Gear_Failure	Landing Gear_Failure	Fault Code 2012 (Proc. L/Gear Bus Comm) Fault Code 2007 (L/Gear, Proc Bus Comm) Fault Code 2063 (19-1 an outliet pressure) Fault Code 2063 (19-1 an outliet temperature) Fault Code 2067 (19-1 an outliet speed) Fault Code 2072 (14-1 hner turbine outliet pressure) Fault Code 2062 (29-Compressor outliet pressure) Fault Code 2062 (29-Compressor outliet pressure) Fault Code 2070 (12-Compressor outliet pressure) Fault Code 2076 (29-1 and pressor outliet pressure) Fault Code 2078 (29-1 and pressor outliet pressure) Fault Code 2078 (29-1 and pressor outliet pressure)	Fault Group # 76	CP6 Landing Gear	5.000000
Pilot Control	Pilot Control_Failure	Pilot Control_Failure	Fault Code 2013 (Proc. Pilot Bus Comm) Fault Code 2008 (Pilot, Proc Bus Comm) Fault Code 2068 (Pil-fan outliet pressure) Fault Code 2069 (Ti-fan outliet temperature) Fault Code 2067 (Si-fan drive speed) Fault Code 2072 (T4-Inner turbine outliet temperature) Fault Code 2026 (P4-Inner turbine outliet pressure) Fault Code 2026 (P4-Inner turbine outliet pressure) Fault Code 2026 (S2-lan speed) Fault Code 2026 (S2-lan speed)	Fault Group # 74	CP3 Pilot Control	7.000000
PWR Relay	PWR Relay_Failure	PWR Relay Failure	Fault Code 2016 (Pwr Relay test - Alternator) Fault Code 2017 (Pwr Relay test - battery) Fault Code 2061 (P1-fan outlet pressure) Fault Code 2069 (T1-fan outlet temperature) Fault Code 2067 (S1-fan drive speed)	Fault Group # 4	ECU VCU 1553 cable network PWR Relay CP7	7.300000

This excerpt from an **eXpress** Fault Signature Analysis Chart shows columns that list the fault codes that would be reported for each failure, along with the specific items indicted by each fault signature.

**Encouraging Innovation** – In addition to its predefined "standard" formats, **FMECA Plus** also supports non-traditional applications of failure-based analysis.

The *eXpress Fault Signature Analysis Chart*, for instance, can be a valuable tool for cross-checking or even influencing the development of operational or embedded diagnostics.

With all this flexibility at your fingertips, it will be hard not to imagine new and unique ways of employing **FMECA Plus** within your own projects.

## Additional Plusses

- Data is derived from multiple engineering & analysis disciplines, eliminating redundant effort and reducing program costs and risks
- Use of Model-based data ensures FMECA consistency, repeatability and traceability
- Approach is consistent with SAE J1739, MIL-STD-1629A and other standard FMECA practices
- Innovative use of diagnostic analysis allows the FMEA to aide in the reduction of False Alarms and System Aborts

- **FMECA Plus** results can inform the development of Prognostics (PHM), Embedded Diagnostics, Run-Time Test Executives and IETM-hosted troubleshooting
- Compatible with existing FMECA databases and tools, the powerful import capabilities in *eXpress* maximize data reuse
- Easy updates permit FMECA efforts to remain relevant throughout development and operational life cycles
- Results can be easily exported to MS Excel or XML

